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THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CHAPTER OF THE TRANSPACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT AND INVESTMENT
IN DEVELOPING NATIONS
KRISTA L. COX*
1. INTRODUCTION
The United States has some of the highest standards of
intellectual property protection in the world, though many
copyright and patent laws in the United States are limited through
balancing provisions that provide exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by the intellectual property system. The United States
also currently has robust industries that rely on intellectual
property protection, such as the Pharmaceutical Research
Association of America (PhRMA), the Motion Pictures Association
of America (MPAA) or the Recording Industry Association of
America RIAA), and their value is often increased through higher
standards. It is one of the few net-exporters of intellectual
property and, as a result, receives greater benefits from heightened
intellectual property standards than do countries that are netimporters of these goods. While the United States has its own
balance between intellectual property rights and the public interest
in its domestic laws, often it seeks only to export the rights for
rightholders without the corresponding limitations and exceptions.
The United States has engaged in efforts to raise intellectual
property standards worldwide through the creation of new global
norms such as through negotiations of the Trans-Pacific
* Director of Public Policy Initiatives, Association of Research Libraries
(ARL). J.D., University of Notre Dame; B.A. University of California, Santa
Barbara. These comments exemplify my reflections on, as well as some comments
delivered, at the University of Pennsylvania’s Journal of International Law’s
Symposium on International Regulation of Investment in the Rising Powers held
on November 8, 2013. At the time of the symposium, I was employed as the staff
attorney of Knowledge Ecology International (KEI). These comments reflect my
personal thoughts and should not be attributed to my organization. I am deeply
grateful to the University of Pennsylvania’s Journal of Law for the invitation to
participate in the symposium, as well as to the wonderful moderator and copanelists on the session on Intellectual Property Law and Investment in
Developing Nations.
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Partnership Agreement (TPP). One of the common arguments
used in pushing for higher protections for intellectual property is
that such standards will result in economic growth and
development, either through burgeoning industries that rely on
heightened intellectual property protection or through foreign
direct investment.1 However, studies have shown that “rapid
[economic] growth is more often associated with weaker IP
protection. In technologically advanced developing countries,
there is some evidence that IP protection becomes important at a
certain stage of development, but that stage is not until a country is
well into the category of upper middle income developing
countries.”2 According to another study, factors including “cost
conditions, market size, levels of human capital and infrastructural
development and broad macroeconomic conditions”, as well as
deregulation, have been found to be more important to foreign
direct investment than the levels of intellectual property
protection.3 In fact, countries like Brazil, China and India have
seen high influxes of foreign direct investment, even with low
levels of intellectual property protection.4
1 See, e.g., Jay Taylor, Protecting IP to Foster Economic Growth in Malaysia,
PHRMA (July 23, 2013), http://www.phrma.org/catalyst/malaysia-protecting-ipfosters-growth (“[S]trengthening intellectual property protections [results] in an
influx of foreign direct investment and trade in high technology products, and . . .
increased levels of research and development and innovation in developed and
developing countries”); Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Relationship
Between Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 9 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 163, 165–66 (1998) (“[T]here is broad recognition that IPR systems play an
important role in the promotion of technological progress.”). But see Amy Jocelyn
Glass & Kamal Saggi, Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 56 J.
INT’L ECON. 387 (2002) (finding that stronger IPR protection does not better protect
individuals from imitation than Northern firms).
2 Jean-Eric Aubert, Promoting Innovation in Developing Countries: A Conceptual
Framework 26, (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3554, Apr. 2005).
3 TRANSNAT’L CORPS. & MGMT. DIV. OF THE U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. DEV.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 3 (1993).
4
See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Foreign Direct Investment and the
China Exception, in THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 153,
153, 158 (Robert C. Bird & Subhash C. Jain eds., 2008) (noting that other factors
also play a role in attracting foreign investment: “[i]n the case of China, foreign
investors are usually not attracted by the strength of the country’s intellectual
property protection. Rather, they entered the Chinese market because of the
drastically lower production costs, the country’s enormous market, its inefficient
economic system and the preferential treatment of foreign investors” and “if
stronger intellectual property protection always led to more FDI, ‘recent FDI
flows to developing economies would have gone largely to sub-Saharan Africa
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Higher levels of intellectual property protection may therefore
be unnecessary to attract investment in developing countries.
Accepting these higher standards may not only be unnecessary in
promoting investment, but can also result in negative impacts on
development. Higher protections for copyrighted and patented
goods raise the price of culture, education, and medicines that can
Thus, developing
detrimentally affect developing nations.5
countries carefully weigh the risks of accepting such higher
standards, particularly where they are unnecessary in promoting
investment and development.
2.

U.S. HISTORY: RELIANCE ON FOREIGN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
DURING DEVELOPING YEARS

The United States currently has very high standards of
intellectual property protection, though historically this was not
always the case. When the United States was still developing, it
did not provide protection to foreign intellectual property owners.
Instead, the United States encouraged reliance on foreign
works prior to the 1891 International Copyright Act.6 Recognition
of foreign copyright in the United States, and increased intellectual
property standards more generally, came not with the intention of
attracting foreign direct investment, but rather because of external

and Eastern Europe . . . [rather than] China, Brazil, and other high-growth, largemarket developing economies with weak IPRs.’” (internal citations omitted)).
5
See Knowledge Ecology International, Letter dated Mar. 22, 2011 from
Knowledge Ecology International addressed to Anand Grover, Special
Rapporteur for the U.N.: Complaint About the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement
Negotiation
(Mar.
22,
2011),
available
at
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/r2h_anand_grover_tpp_22march2011.p
df (discussing how the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Negotiation will
negatively impact public health); Krista L. Cox, The United States’ Demands for
Intellectual Property Enforcement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and
Impacts for Developing Countries 2 (Knowledge Ecology Int’l, Working Paper, 2012),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2188029
(“[P]roposed higher levels of enforcement of intellectual property rights would
impact access to knowledge and access to medical technologies, among other
issues.”).
6
International Copyright Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1106 (1891). The 1790
Copyright Act stated, “[N]othing in this act shall be construed . . . to prohibit the
importation or vending, reprinting or publishing within the United States, of any
map, chart, book or books, written, printed, or published by any person not a
citizen of the United States, in foreign parts . . . .“ Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat.
124 (1790).
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and internal pressures. Domestically, it was seen as in the interest
of the United States to recognize foreign copyrights as local
stakeholders lobbied for strong protections. The University of
California system and the University of Virginia, as well as Mark
Twain, Louisa May Alcott and other prominent domestic authors,
advocated for recognition of foreign copyright in order to ensure
that their own copyrights would be recognized in foreign countries
and that foreign works—which were often available at a fraction of
the cost of domestic works—would not compete with their own
works.7
Similarly, the first patent act only provided protection to
citizens of the United States and, later after amendments, those
who had been residents for at least two years or those intending to
become citizens.8 Not until 1836 did the United States remove the
restrictions regarding nationality on patenting, though the 1836
Act did charge nationals of other countries fees of ten to sixteen
times higher than United States citizens and residents.9
Although the United States, while it was in its own stages of
developing, provided low standards of intellectual property
protection and did not recognize foreign copyrights or patents, it
now seeks to push these high standards on the rest of the world. It
has done so through a variety of mechanisms, perhaps most
notably its annual “Special 301” lists—a unilateral process where
the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) creates
a “watch list” of countries that do not implement high standards of
protection, even though they may fully comply with international
obligations—and through the negotiations of free trade
agreements. Such efforts could be considered hypocritical and can
slow the development of developing countries.
3.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS IN THE TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

Since 2010, the United States has been engaged in negotiations
for a large regional trade agreement known as the Trans-Pacific

7
See, e.g., Edward G. Hudon, Mark Twain and the Copyright Dilemma, 52
A.B.A. J. 56, 56 (1966) (“[I]n this country foreign authors were left to the mercy of
literary pirates, and American authors suffered the same fate abroad.”).
8 Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (1790); Act of April 17, 1800, 2 Stat. 37 (1800).
9 Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117, § 9 (1836).
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Partnership Agreement (TPP).10 The number of parties since the
inception of the negotiations has grown and now includes twelve
countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam and the United
States.11 The negotiations have taken place behind closed doors
and the public has not been granted access to the negotiating texts
or positions of the parties.12
Although none of the negotiating texts have officially been
released, negotiating positions have come to light through various
leaks.13 The United States’ proposals have reflected aggressive
provisions reflecting high standards of intellectual property
protection that generally provide new rights to rightholders,
without adequate balancing provisions for the public interest.14

STATEMENT OF THE MINISTERS AND HEADS OF DELEGATION FOR THE TRANSPACIFIC PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Dec.
13, 2013), available at http://www.ustr.gov/tpp.
11
James Love, Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY INT’L (Dec. 13, 2010, 5:37 PM), http://keionline.org/tpp.
12
Id. See also Complaint about the Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 5
(discussing the lack of transparency in the Partnership); Mike Masnick, Members of
Congress Demand USTR Open Up On TPP, TECHDIRT (Sept. 6, 2012, 8:18 PM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120906/02034520290/members-congressdemand-ustr-open-up-tpp.shtml (“We've been talking about the incredible and
ridiculous level of secrecy that the USTR has kept with regards to the TPP
negotiations. . . . [T]he public, and even key Congressional staffers are left out in
the cold.”).
13 The first of the three most notable leaks occurred in March 2011, when the
United States’ comprehensive proposal for intellectual property (tabled in the
February 2011 round in Santiago, Chile) was leaked. Trans-Pacific Partnership,
Intellectual
Property
Rights
Chapter
(Feb.
2011),
available
at
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb2011-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf
[hereinafter U.S. Feb. 2011 Leaked Text]. The second leak, of the United States’
proposals on pharmaceutical-related issues, occurred in October 2011. TransPacific Partnership, Intellectual Property Rights Chapter (Sept. 2011), available at
http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wpcontent/uploads/2011/10/TransPacificIP1.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Oct. 2011 Leaked
Text]. The third, by Wikileaks in November 2013, contained the consolidated
intellectual property text, including the negotiating positions of all parties. TransPacific Partnership, Intellectual Property Rights Chapter (Aug. 2013) available at
http://wikileaks.org/tpp/static/pdf/Wikileaks-secret-TPP-treaty-IP-chapter.pdf
[hereinafter U.S. Nov. 2013 Leaked Text] (reflecting the text as of August 2013, a
date which coincided with the last full negotiating round which took place in
Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei).
14
See Krista L. Cox, Hot Topics in the Intellectual Property Chapter of the TransPacific Partnership Agreement (TPP): How Will Things Shake Out?, KNOWLEDGE
10
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These higher standards of protection proposed by the United
States include, inter alia, longer terms of protection for copyright,
aggressive measures on “digital locks” or technological protection
measures, patent term extensions, controversial measures to link
patent status to drug registration, and high measures of damages.15
Overall, these proposals would result in higher costs for
copyrighted and patented goods. In some areas of the intellectual
property text, it appears that the United States proposals
specifically target the domestic laws or intellectual property
practices of India16 or China,17 in an attempt to create new global
norms that would isolate these countries.
For many of the parties to the negotiations, particularly
developing nations, the United States’ proposals, if accepted,
would require changes to their domestic laws, impacting access to
knowledge and access to medicines. These proposed provisions
often go well beyond international treaties and are not part of the

ECOLOGY INT’L (Sept. 3, 2013, 12:12 PM), http://keionline.org/node/1794
(describing controversial and potential problems in the TPP Agreement).
15
Id. See also Cox, supra note 5 (describing the United States’ proposed
measures in the agreement).
16
Compare, e.g., The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, A.I.R. Manual (1979), vol. 27
(India), § 3(d) (stating that a new invention does not include “the mere discovery
of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement of
the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new property or
new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or
apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least
one new reactant”) with U.S. Feb. 2011 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at art. 8.1 (“In
addition, the Parties confirm that: patents shall be available for any new forms,
uses, or methods of using a known product; and a new form, use, or method of
using a known product may satisfy the criteria for patentability, even if such
invention does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that
product.”). Similarly, Article 25 of the Indian Patent Act explicitly permits
systems of pre-grant opposition “[w]here an application for a patent has been
published but a patent has not been granted, any person may, in writing,
represent by way of opposition to the Controller against the grant of patent,”
Patent Act § 25 (1970), while Article 8.7 of the U.S. Feb. 2011 Leaked Text would
prohibit pre-grant opposition “[w]here a Party provides proceedings that permit a
third party to oppose the grant of a patent, a Party shall not make such
proceedings available before the grant of the patent.” Trans-Pacific Partnership,
Intellectual Property Rights Chapter, supra note 13, at art. 8.7.
17
Mike Palmedo, President Obama: Intellectual Property Provisions in the TPP
“Will Help Us in Our Negotiations with China”, INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Oct. 14, 2013),
http://infojustice.org/archives/30965.
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current legal regimes of many of the TPP parties.18 Why, then,
would developing countries like Malaysia and Vietnam, or
wealthier nations with smaller markets like New Zealand and
Brunei, agree to these higher standards that are likely to increases
costs for education and make it more difficult to protect the public
health?
In an agreement like the TPP, the intellectual property chapter
does not exist in a vacuum and consideration must be given to the
over twenty other chapters. Pressure to accept these proposals on
intellectual property can arise in exchange for the United States,
the country with the largest economic market, making concessions
in other areas, such as better market access for dairy, sugar, rice or
textiles—goods that other countries export. Intellectual property
simply is not a priority for many of the TPP negotiating parties,
particularly in comparison to market access for their key exports.
4.

BALANCING THE PUBLIC INTEREST: PRESERVING FLEXIBILITIES

All countries, but particularly developing countries, should
carefully consider the effect that higher intellectual property rights
protection will have on important public interest values such as
education and the public health. Although all negotiating parties
are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
and therefore bound by minimum international standards, TRIPS
provides for numerous flexibilities that permit members to
implement the agreement in various ways that take into account
the public interest.
One primary flexibility of the TRIPS Agreement lies in the fact
that many terms used are left undefined, thereby allowing
18
Many of the aforementioned proposals have already been accepted by
those countries with existing free trade agreements with the United States. See
generally, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Australia, ch. 17, Jan. 1, 2005, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/australia/as
set_upload_file469_5141.pdf; Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, ch. 17, Jan. 1,
2004,
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/chile/asset_
upload_file912_4011.pdf; Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Peru, ch. 16, Feb. 1, 2009,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1031; Free Trade Agreement,
U.S.-Singapore,
Jan.
1,
2004,
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/singapore/a
sset_upload_file708_4036.pdf. See also Public Citizen, TPP Countries Resource Page,
http://www.citizen.org/TPP-country-resource-page (providing comparisons of
current regimes with prior leaked text).
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countries to determine for themselves, according to their national
context, how to interpret standards such as, for example, the terms
used for establishing patentability criteria of “new,” “inventive
step,” and “capable of industrial application.”19 For example, such
flexibility permits countries to set higher standards for
patentability, among other areas. The initial proposal by the
United States in February 2011 revealed efforts to restrict this
flexibility by expressly defining such terms in a manner that would
effectively lower patentability criteria.20
Another critical flexibility expressly exists in Article 6 of the
TRIPS Agreement, which notes that, “nothing in this Agreement
shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual
property rights.”21 This article permits each member to determine
whether to implement systems of national, regional, or
international exhaustion of goods. Lower-income countries or
those with smaller markets often prefer international exhaustion,
in order to ensure that the country can import goods protected by
intellectual property.22 Parallel importation can allow countries to
access goods like books, movies, and medicines, often at more
affordable prices. Sometimes, goods are not even available in
certain markets. These markets are ignored by right holders who
choose not to invest, either because of the low-income status of the
country or, in the case of certain high-income countries, because of
the smaller size of their markets.23 The proposed text tabled by the
United States in February 2011 included a provision that would
19 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27.1,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
20
U.S. Feb. 2011 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at art. 8.
21 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 19, at art. 6.
22
See Alberto Cerda, USTR New Exclusive Right for Copyright Holders:
Importation Provision in the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY INT’L (July 5, 2011, 10:00 PM), http://keionline.org/node/1176 (“[S]ome
TPPA negotiating parties have adopted international exhaustion of rights into
their domestic laws, which means right holders do not control international free
flow of their works . . . . Sacrificing consumers’ interest is highly problematic for
those countries, because they cannot enjoy any advantage of scale economies”);
Brief for Knowledge Ecology Int’l as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party,
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 133 S.Ct. 1351 (2013) (No. 11-697), 2012 WL
2867812,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2109718 (discussing the
application of exhaustion in U.S. law).
23
Id.
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ban parallel importation of most copyrighted works.24 Subsequent
to that proposal, the Supreme Court decided in Kirtsaeng v. John
Wiley & Sons by a 6–3 margin that the United States implements a
system of international exhaustion and the first sale of a
copyrighted good anywhere in the world exhausts the rights of the
rightholder, thereby permitting parallel importation.25 This ruling,
which settled a circuit split amongst the federal appellate courts,
directly conflicted with the United States’ proposal in the TPP.
Even several months after the Court’s ruling in March 2013, the
United States’ proposal regarding parallel importation remained
unchanged, as reflected in the August 2013 text leaked by
Wikileaks.26
The TRIPS Agreement also permits certain exclusions from
patentability under Articles 27.2 and 27.3 including to “protect
ordre public or morality,” as well as specific exclusions for
diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods, and plants and
animals.27 Again, the February 2011 text by the United States
sought to limit these flexibilities. For example, the initial proposal
for the intellectual property chapter added the word “only” to the
exclusion of that which is necessary to protect ordre public or
morality, limiting this provision further than Article 27.2 of the
TRIPS Agreement.28 The United States’ initial proposal also would
reverse the explicit exception contained in Article 27.3 of the TRIPS
Agreement, instead requiring the patenting of medical methods and
plants and animals.29 The August 2013 text reflected some changes
to the initial United States’ proposal, and Article 27.2 of TRIPS is
replicated in the agreed-to text of the TPP without the word
“only.”30 Furthermore, the United States modified its language
regarding patenting of diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical
U.S. Feb. 2011 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at art. 4.2.
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 133 S.Ct. 1351 (2013).
26
U.S. Nov. 2013 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at art. QQ.G.3.
27 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 19, at arts. 27.2, 27.3.
28
U.S. Feb. 2011 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at art. 8.3.
29
Id. at art. 8.2.
30
Compare U.S. Feb. 2011 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at art. 8.3 (“Each Party
may only exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within its territory
of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or
morality” (emphasis added)) with U.S. Nov. 2013 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at
art. QQ.E.1.2 (“Each Party may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention
within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre
public or morality”).
24
25
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methods, though its proposal has not garnered the support of a
single other TPP negotiating party.31
Another key flexibility contained in the TRIPS Agreement
exists in Article 31 governing compulsory licenses or “[o]ther [u]se
[w]ithout [a]uthorization of the [r]ight [h]older.”32 The TRIPS
Agreement explicitly permits governments to allow the production
of patented products even absent the consent of the rightholder.
Each member to the TRIPS Agreement has the sovereign right to
issue a compulsory license and determine the circumstances under
which such a license may be granted. In 2001, WTO members
concluded the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health
(“Doha Declaration”), a statement that largely confirmed the rights
of members to protect the public health and definitively affirmed
some existing flexibilities.33 Although some rightholders and
governments have tried to limit the Doha Declaration to a set of
specific diseases or cases of national emergency, including,
arguably, through the United States’ initial text on the Doha
Declaration contained in its TPP proposal,34 the WTO has
See U.S. Nov. 2013 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at art. QQ.E.1.3(b).
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 19, at art. 31.
33 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of Nov. 14, 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. See
also World Trade Organization, TRIPS and Health: Frequently Asked Questions:
Compulsory
Licensing
of
Pharmaceuticals
and
TRIPS,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm
(last
visited March 1, 2014) (“For the main part the declaration was important for
clarifying the TRIPS Agreement’s flexibilities and assuring governments that they
can use the flexibilities, because some governments were unsure about how the
flexibilities would be interpreted.”).
34 Compare World Trade Organization, TRIPS and Health, supra note 33 with
U.S. Oct. 2011 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at art. x (declining to reference the Doha
Declaration, the United States’ proposal on pharmaceuticals tabled in September
2011 incorporates portions of the language of the Declaration while omitting other
sections. This selectivity of the language contained in Doha could be read as an
attempt by the United States to limit its application to “HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
malaria and other epidemics as well as circumstances of extreme urgency or
national emergency.” As a result, efforts to address non-communicable diseases
or other non-epidemics, non-urgent situations could be threatened by the
language proposed by the United States for the TPP). See also Brook K. Baker, US
Doha Flexibilities in its Proposed TPP IP Text Are Not Nearly Good Enough,
INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Oct. 23, 2011), http://infojustice.org/resource-library/us-dohaflexibilities-in-its-proposed-tpp-ip-text-are-not-nearly-good-enough
(“[C]lose
analysis [of the Oct. 2011 leaked text] proves that the words chosen do not
provide sufficient guarantees to assure that TPPA partners will be able to make
maximum use of TRIPS and Doha compliant flexibilities to maximize access to
31
32
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confirmed that a government does not need to limit issuance of a
compulsory license to emergencies:
“This is a common
misunderstanding. The TRIPS Agreement does not specifically list
the reasons that might be used to justify compulsory licensing.
However, the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health
confirms that countries are free to determine the grounds for
granting compulsory licences.”35
The TRIPS Agreement also permits governments to address
anti-competitive behavior and abuses of intellectual property
rights.36 Both the United States and Japan have opposed a
provision supported by the other ten TPP negotiating parties that
would permit parties to address “(a) the abuse of intellectual
property rights by right holders or the resort to practices that
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international
transfer of technology; and (b) anticompetitive practices that may
result from the abuse of intellectual property rights . . .”37 signaling
the intention to limit this flexibility.
While the above list of flexibilities is not exhaustive, it reflects
some key areas where the United States has sought to change
global norms and limit existing flexibilities under international
law.
These flexibilities provide important mechanisms for
countries to address abuses by rightholders and create intellectual
property systems that take the public interest into account. In
order to protect serious public interest concerns including, inter
alia, education and public health, negotiating partners in the TPP
should preserve these TRIPS flexibilities.
One tactic a country might take to protect the public with
respect to intellectual property would be simply to point to
existing international standards and try to limit obligations to these
minimum standards, such as those found in the TRIPS Agreement.
Even with agreements that go beyond TRIPS and create new
rights, such as the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty, these international agreements tend to be less
aggressive than the United States’ proposals in the TPP and permit
greater flexibility in implementation.38 For example, the United
more affordable medicines for all.”).
35 World Trade Organization, TRIPS and Health, supra note 33.
36 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 19, at art. 40.
37 U.S. Nov. 2013 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at art. QQ.A.9.
38
Compare WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), art. 11, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36
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States’ copyright-related proposals on technological protection
measures and Internet service provider (ISP) liability are based on
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), legislation in
which the proponents admitted the provisions went far beyond
international obligations.39 Harm may therefore be mitigated by
accepting the TRIPS-plus measures that exist in other international
agreements and agreeing to ratify these treaties, but rejecting the
specific provisions of the proposed TPP text that limit flexibilities
or direct countries to implement treaties in a particular manner.
Furthermore, although the intellectual property chapter may
not be considered the most important chapter for many of the
parties to the TPP, in large trade agreements with wide ranging
levels of development, one might argue that greater leverage exists
than in a bilateral trade agreement. In a large scale agreement
between numerous parties, like the TPP, developing countries may
choose to form voting blocs and support each other on key issues,
either by attributing support to proposals made by other
developing countries or by opposing aggressive provisions by the
United States. A group of five countries across the development
spectrum—Canada, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand and
Singapore—in fact came together to draft and table a
counterproposal to the United States with respect to
pharmaceuticals.40 After the proposal was tabled, Vietnam joined
I.L.M. 65 (entered into force Mar. 2, 2002) (“Contracting Parties shall provide
adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention
of effective technological measures”) and WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty (WPPT), art. 18, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (entered into force May
20, 2002) (“Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and
effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological
measures that are used by performers or producers of phonograms”) with U.S.
Feb. 2011 Leaked Text, supra note 13, at art. 4.9 (outlining specific remedies and
consequences for circumventing the partnership agreement).
39 See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 519, 537
(1999) (“Although Administration officials admitted in Congressional testimony
that its preferred legislation went beyond what the WIPO Copyright Treaty
required, it argued for this broader rule in part to set a standard that would help
the U.S. persuade other countries to pass similarly strong rules.”).
40 Krista Cox, TPP Negotiating Parties’ Counterproposal to the US on Medicines
Represents a More Flexible Approach, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Nov. 14, 2013, 8:39
AM), http://keionline.org/node/1826. Reportedly, Australia was one of six
countries that took part in initially drafting this proposal, but Australia dropped
from the group when the text was tabled during the August 2013 round in Brunei
due to the period of elections taking place domestically. Id.
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support in many portions of the counterproposal, which largely
reflected the standards of the TRIPS Agreement, including
explicitly preserving many TRIPS flexibilities.41
Alternatively, however, an argument can be made that because
the United States represents a disproportionate percentage of the
economy in the TPP—particularly before latecomer parties,
Canada, Mexico and Japan42—it “has more political and economic
leverage over the other parties in the TPP” and “is able to rely
more on its sheer economic and geopolitical strengths to push for
provisions that are in the interest of its intellectual property
industries.”43 Furthermore, as discussed supra, the United States
may offer concessions in other chapters in exchange for receiving
support for its intellectual property provisions.44 Thus, the voting
blocs may quickly disintegrate once the United States makes
concessions in particular areas of concerns to countries that have
opposed the United States’ proposals.
Countries might also try to use current international will and
trends in an attempt to resist the United States’ TRIPS-plus
proposals. In June 2013, for example, a WIPO diplomatic
conference successfully concluded the Marrakesh Treaty to
Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind,
Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled45 and fifty-one
Id.
Canada and Mexico joined the negotiations on December 2012 during the
round that took place in Auckland, New Zealand. Japan entered the negotiations
on the last day of the round that took place in Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia in July
2013. The first official round of the TPP negotiations took place in 2010.
43
Peter K. Yu, The Alphabet Soup of Transborder Intellectual Property
Enforcement, 60 DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE 16, 25–26 (2012). Yu notes that the TPP
negotiations may be more dangerous than the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement, an intellectual property enforcement agreement negotiated between
primarily high-income, developed countries. Yu notes, “[a]lthough the ACTA
negotiations brought together two major intellectual property powers—the
European Union and the United States—the continuous disagreements between
these two powers resulted in the adoption of a more moderate agreement.” Id. at
25.
44 Id. at 27 (“Because of the different value negotiating parties place on trade
and trade-related items, some parties may be willing to concede more on
intellectual property protection and enforcement in exchange for greater benefits
in other trade or trade-related areas.”).
45
Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons
Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, adopted June 27,
2013, WIPO Doc. VIP/DC/8 Rev. [hereinafter Marrakesh Treaty]. Although the
treaty is not yet in force, among the TPP negotiating parties, Chile, Peru and the
United States have all signed the agreement. WIPO Administered Treaties,
41
42
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countries immediately signed, a record number of signatures
during a WIPO treaty signing ceremony.46 Significantly, this treaty
represented the first conclusion of a WIPO human rights treaty or
agreement designed to primarily serve the interests of the users of
intellectual property goods rather than the rightholder. The
Marrakesh Treaty created minimum standards for limitations and
exceptions to copyright rather than minimum standards for
protection of copyright. Currently, WIPO also appears to be
considering other treaties in the interest of users of intellectual
property, such as one for libraries and one on education.47 TPP
parties may try to leverage the international will in promoting the
positive agenda and ensuring robust limitations and exceptions to
intellectual property rights in the context of the trade agreement.
5.

CONCLUSION

The choice to institute higher levels of intellectual property
protection, particularly without proper balancing mechanisms to
protect the users, can detrimentally affect the public interest. Even
with the promise of foreign direct investment or greater market
access to economies such as the United States, caution must be
taken to ensure that certain TRIPS flexibilities are preserved so that
these countries can further develop.
Furthermore, and as
discussed above, foreign direct investment is often more
dependent on factors other than the levels of intellectual property
protection and economies such as India or China are seeing
increased levels of investment, despite lower levels of protection.
One might also consider what the important trends are in
intellectual property investment. While certainly the traditional
content industries remain viable investment choices, recent years

Marrakesh
VIP
Treaty,
WIPO,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/wipo_treaties/parties.jsp?treaty_id=843&gro
up_id=1 (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
46
Thiru Balasubramaniam, 28 June 2013: 51 Signatories to the Marrakesh
Treaty, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L
(July 2, 2013, 4:17 AM),
http://keionline.org/node/1769.
47
See WIPO, Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, 26th
Sess., Dec. 16–20, 2013, Draft Agenda, Agenda Item 7–8, SCCR/26/1 Prov. (May
13, 2013) (indicating that “[l]imitations and exceptions for libraries and archives”
and “[l]imitations and exceptions for educational and research institutions and for
persons with other disabilities” are agenda items).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/3

03_COX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CHAPTER

10/13/2014 11:07 AM

1059

have seen the growth of “fair use” industries.48 These industries
depend on or benefit from limitations and exceptions, most notably
“fair use,” as a critical component to their business models rather
than relying on the creation of higher levels of intellectual property
protection. Such industries may include manufacturers of certain
consumer devices, programmers, software developers, educational
institutions, Internet search and web-hosting providers, among
others. A 2011 study of fair use industries in the United States
highlighted that these industries represent one-sixth of total GDP,
amounting to $17.7 million.49 In 2008 and 2009, fair use industries
reportedly “generated total revenue averaging $4.6 trillion, a 35
percent increase over 2002 revenue of $3.4 trillion.”50 Exports for
fair use industries increased sixty-four percent from 2002 to 2008.51
Singapore, after amending its copyright law to expand fair use,
saw an increase in annual growth for its private copying
industries.52 As these fair industries grow and contribute to an
increasing percentage of a country’s GDP, it may be time to rethink
whether continually ratcheting up intellectual property protections
will ultimately cause more harm than good, not only in terms of
the public interest in accessing patented and copyrighted goods,
but also with respect to contributions to the economy as new
technologies and industries arise.

48
See generally THOMAS ROGERS ET. AL., ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF
INDUSTRIES RELYING ON FAIR USE (2011).
49 Id. at 21.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 26.
52
ROYA GHAFELE & BENJAMIN GILBERT, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF FAIR USE IN
COPYRIGHT LAW: COUNTERFACTUAL IMPACT ANALYSIS OF FAIR USE POLICY ON
PRIVATE COPYING TECHNOLOGY AND COPYRIGHT MARKETS IN SINGAPORE 5 (2012),
(“Prior to the amendment of fair use policies, private copying technology
industries experienced—1.97% average annual growth. After the changes were
introduced, the same industries enjoyed a 10.18% average annual growth rate.”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

